




SPRING 1878Michael W. Keran*
Why has the international value of the dollar
declined over the past year and a half? There is a
popularimpression(sometimes reinforced by the
rhetoric of government officials) that the dollar
has been driven down by speculators who have a
vested interest in seeing an undervalued dollar.
According to this view, the magnitude of the
decline is unrelated to economic fundamentals
and represents the irrational behavior of spec-
ulators.
Most economists have difficulty with this
explanation. A considerable body of evidence
shows that speculationtendsto drive the value of
a currency towards the long-run equilibrium
value; i.e., value determined by economic fun-
damentals. Those who misjudge fundamentals
and attempt to drive the dollar away from its
long-run equilibrium value will tend to lose
money. On the average they will buy when the
market value is high and sell when the market
value is low. Those speculators who mostclearly
perceive the underlying fundamentals and ac-
cordingly take a position intheexchange market
will, on average, make the most profits.
What this means is thatstabilizingspeculation
will tend to be profitable anddestabilizingspecu-
lation to be unprofitable.2 The self-selection
process of unsuccessful speculators leaving the
market to the successful speculators has impor-
tant implications for the exchange markets. In
particular, the observed value of the dollar
would not deviate significantly from the level
consistent with economicfundamentalsfor more
than a short period of time.
Two types of economic factors affect the
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exchange rate-real factors and monetary fac-
tors. The real factors have to do with the relative
attractiveness of any two countries' goods, i.e.,
how many bushels of U.S. wheat are exchanged
for one Japanese colorT.V. set. This is called the
terms oftrade. The monetary factors have to do
with the purchasing power of a currency. If
inflation reduces the domestic purchasingpower
of the dollar, a parallel decline in the dollar's
foreign purchasing power will be achieved by an
exchange-rate adjustment. This is called pur-
chasing power parity.
The purpose ofthis article is to explain move-
ments in the exchange value ofthe dollaragainst
the currencies of seven other major countries
(Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Switz-
erland and the U,K,), during the period of
flexible exchange rates running from roughly
1974 or 1975 through March 1979. Theanalysis
focuses on whether monetaryfactors canexplain
a significantshareofthe movements ofthe dollar
against these seven major currencies. Section I
discusses the role ofmonetary factors in influen-
cing prices in general. Section II discusses the
monetary and real determinants of exchange
rates, with the aid of a model which permits the
empirical estimation of the monetary factors
affecting the exchange rate. In Section III, com-
parative monetary developments in the U.S. and
other industrial countries are analyzed and
shown to be in close alignment with observed
movements of exchange rates. Forillal statistical
analyses confirm that a significant share of the
variation in exchange rates between the dollar
and seven other currencies can be explained by
monetary factors. That section provides fore-
casts ofexchange rates based onactualmonetary
developments in 1978 and forecasts ofmonetary
developments in 1979. Section IV gives a sum-
mary and conclusion.I. Money and Prices
The monetary source of exchange-rate
changes is based on two propositions:
I) The exchange rate between two domestic
currencies will adjust to reflect changes in the
relative domestic purchasing power of the cur-
rencies (i.e., purchasing power parity); and
2) Domestic monetary developments are a
major determinant of domestic inflation rates,
and thus the domestic purchasing power of a
given currency.
The second of these propositions is the mone-
tary theory of inflation-too much money chas-
ing too few goods. In its simplest form, this
theory can be stated as follows:
In the long run, the inflation rate (% D.P) is
determined by the difference between the growth
ofthe nominal money supply (% ~MS) and the
real money demand (% ~md). The nominal
money supply is determined by the government
through its monetary authority. The real de-
mand for money is determined by the private
sector of the economy. The primary motives
behind the demand for money are as a means of
payment and as a store ofvalue. The means-of-
payment desire for money is dependent on the
volume of transactions, which in turn is related
to the level ofa country's real income. A rise in
real income leads to a rise in the real demand for
money.3
The store-of-value desire for money depends
upon the following factors:
I) The sophistication of the financial system,
and the type and convenience of non-monetary
financial assets available to the public;
2) The real interest rate. The higher the real
rate paid onmonetaryassets (e.g., timedeposits),
the higher the moneydemand; the higherthe real
rate paid on non-monetary assets, the lower the
real demand for money.
3) Inflation expectations. The higher the ex-
pected inflation rate, the greater the expected
decline in the value of monetary assets and thus
the lower the real demand for money.
There are a number of ways of translating
these general principles into an empirically
testable proposition. Perhaps one of the oldest
ways of stating this relation is via the familiar
Fisher Equation of Exchange.
This relationship statesthat, in long-run equil-
ibrium, prices (P) will be equal to the ratio of








P= M/md = M/(T/V) =ME
In long-run equilibrium, demand for real
money balances must be equal to actual real
balances (M/ P). Thus, using equation (3), we
identify the long-run equilibrium value of M/P
with (md) and the long-run values of T and V
with the determinants of money demand. Thus:
In this expression, where the barsrefer to long-
run equilibriumvalues, Trepresentsthelong-run
means of payment function of money, while V
represents the long-run store of value function.
We next substitute this long-run behavioral
description of money demand back into the
equation of exchange to obtain:
The stock of money (M) times the velocity of
money(V) equals the physicalvolumeoftransac-
tions (T) times price level (P).
This is true by definition, analogous to the
national-income definition: National Income
Household Consumption plus Business Invest-
ment plus Government Spending. Just as the
national-incomedefinition can be translatedinto
a statement of economic behavior by making
assumptions about consumptionand investment
behavior, so the Fisherequationofexchangecan
be by making assumptions aboutthe factors that
determine the demand for money, i.e., velocity
and transactions.
One can make equation 2 into a behavioral
relationship by introducing the demand for real
money balances. Ifwe rearrange terms in equa-
tion 2, we obtain:
(I) % ~P = % ~MS - % ~md
20money balances. This ratio is defined as excess
money balances (ME). An expression similar to
equation (1) can, of course, be obtained by
taking the time rate ofchange ofall variables in
(5) to obtain:
% ~P = % ~M - % ~(T/V) = % ~ME (Sa)
This expression summarizes the main point of
the monetary theory ofinflation-that ultimate-
ly inflation is determined by excess money
growth (%~ ME). This excess money supply is
the key element in the monetary factors which
determine the exchange rate.
II. Detennination of Exchange Rates
The exchange rate between the currencies of
any two countries will be determined by two
factors, one monetary and one "real." These
separate influences can be summarized in the
following way:
Where Ex is the exchange rate between the U.S.
dollar and some foreign currency (t). Pus is the
long-run equilibrium price level in the U.S.; Pr is
thelong-run equilibrium pricelevel in the foreign
country; t is the equilibrium terms oftrade. The
monetary effects are measured by the relative
price (Pr{Pus), while the real effects are mea-
sured by the terms of trade (t).
I. Real effects: The termsoftrade measure the
value ofonecountry'sgoodsin termsofthe value
of another country's goods, e.g., how many
bushels of U.S. wheat it takes to "purchase" one
Japanese T. V. set. A change in the terms oftrade
could be caused by a change in technology, the
discovery of new sources of raw material, or a
substantial change in relative prices ofimportant
commodities, such as a rise in the price of oil.
2. Monetary effects: Exchange rates fluctuate
to maintain equality between the domestic and
foreign purchasing power ofa currency, accord-
ing to the theory ofpurchasing-power parity (or
PPP). A rise in U.S. prices will reduce the
domestic purchasing power of the dollar. This
will increase the demand for lower-priced foreign
goods and assets, which will depreciatethedollar
relative to the foreign currency. The incentive to
increase demand for foreign goods will subside
only when the dollar has depreciated by an
amount equal to the decline in its domestic
purchasing power, assuming foreign-currency
prices are unchanged. Because monetary factors
determine the domestic purchasing power of a
Ex =(Pr/Pus) . t (6)
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currency (for reasons already discussed), so they
also influence the international exchange value
of that currency.
Purchasing-power parity can be explained in a
number of interrelated ways. Theoretically, the
most general explanation is related to the neu-
trality ofmoney. Ifthe moneysupply is doubled,
all prices will double-or the purchasing power
of money will be reduced by half. For this
proposition to hold for all goods, both domestic
and foreign, the exchange value of the domestic
currency must fall by one-halfrelative to foreign
currency (assuming there is no change in the
excess supply ofmoney abroad). In this way, the
domestic and international purchasing power of
the domestic currency areequal, andthe neutral-
ity of money is preserved. If the foreign money
supply is doubled at the same time as thedomes-
tic money supply, the exchange rate will be
unchanged, because foreign prices will go up as
much as domestic prices.
The market mechanism by which the adjust-
ment process operates is sometimes called the
law ofone price. This is based onthe proposition
thatthe same goods will have the sameprice in all
markets. For example, the dollar price ofwheat
in Kansas City will be the sameas the yen price in
Tokyo, given the dollar/yenexchangerate.Ifthe
price of wheat were higher in Tokyo than in
Kansas City by more than transportation,tariffs
and other costs, then sufficient wheat will be
shipped to Japan to drive its pricetowardequali-
ty with the U.S. price.
Short vs. Long Run Considerations
In Section I, we emphasized that the relation
between money and prices was a long-run prop-
osition. Equilibrium in the market for goods
takes some time to achieve, because households
must change their consumption habits and firms% ilEx = % il(MEr / MEus) + % ilt (9)
Log Ex = ao + al log (MEr / MEus) (8)
Taking the logs of both sides and making the
simplifying assumption that the terms of tradj::
are constant, we can empirically estimate the
equation as follows:
(7) Ex = (M& / MBus) . t
The changes in theexchange rateareequaltoa
constant term (ao') which measures the changes
in the real factors, plus a coefficient (al') which
measures the impact on exchange rates of the
change in the ratiooftheexcess moneygrowth in
the U.S. and in the foreign country. This is
hypothesized to equal unity. The time lag in
equations 8 and 10 reflects the length of time
needed by market participants to recognize that
Assuming that the real factors which affect
exchange rates-i.e., the terms of trade (%
ilt)-change at a constant rate, we obtain the
empirically testable equation:
measure of long-term PPP than are current
goods prices. Second, because prices of traded
goods increase with a decline in the exchange
value ofthe dollar, and becausetradedgoodsare
a significant component of the general price
index, the time lag between money and prices
may be shortened when a country moves from
fixed to flexible exchange rates.
Where aa is a measure ofan unchanged terms-of-
trade effect on the exchange rate, and al is a
measure of the monetary influence on the ex-
change rate. Its value is expected to be positive
and equal to one. Alternatively, we can express
equation 7 in terms of changes:
The Model
This discussion can be formalized and an
equation specified for empirical testing. Given
initial condition values for theexchange rateand
excess money, and substituting equation 5 into
equation 6, we get:
must change their production patterns. It is
costly for households to speculate oninflation by
purchasing goods in excess of consumption
needs, because the cost of holding "inventories"
is high. While anticipatory purchases in a period
ofrising prices will occur, the amount is severely
limited. Thus goods priceswill adjustonlyslowly
to a rise in excess money supply.
In contrast, the market for assets seems to
adjust relatively quickly to changes in supplyand
demand, because "inventory" adjustments in
assets can be achieved at low cost. One can
rearrange his portfolio of assets by "instanta-
neous" buy-and-sell decisions at relatively low
transactions cost, and generally zero carrying
cost. In general, we assume that goods prices in
"flow" markets take longer to adjust to shifts in
supply and demand than assets prices in "stock"
markets.
This distinction has important implications
with respect to the monetary determinants of
exchange rates. The exchange rate-the interna-
tional price of the dollar-can be affected by
shifts in the internationalsupplyanddemand for
dollars, which in turndepend uponinternational
trade in goods, services, and financial assets.
Trade in goods and services changes relatively
slowly in response to changes in income and
prices, as is typical of all "flow" markets. But
trade in financial assets can change quickly, as is
typical of all "stock" markets.
The exchange rate, in the short run, thus is
determined by the capital account ofthe balance
of payments. A change in the excess money
supply (once recognized) could translate imme-
diately into a change in the exchange rate. The
monetary effect on the exchange rate would be
the same in magnitude as that on the domestic
inflation rate. The only difference would be in
terms of timing: the effect on the exchange rate
would occur quickly, while theeffect ontheprice
of domestically produced goods would be
delayed.
This analysis has several important implica-
tions. First, the exchange rate betweenthe dollar
and any foreign currency will measure the equi-
librium purchasing power parity of the two
currencies. If the exchange rate adjusts quickly
and prices adjust slowly to the same excess
money supply, the exchange rate may be a better
22the relative excess supplies of money had
changed. This might well vary between coun-
tries, depending upon the country's past mone-
tary policy and inflation experience.
4 Intro-
ducing time lags into equations 8 and 10
produces the basic estimating equations which
will be considered in the next section.
n
log EXt = ao+raj log (MEr!MEus)t-n
(II)
n
~log EXt = ao' +Iaj' ~log(MEriMEuS>t-n
(12)
n
WhereI refers to the sum of months in which
changes in excess money will havetheircomplete
effect on the exchange rate.
UI. Testing the Monetary Approach
We present evidence here to support the prop-
osition that monetary factors explain a signifi-
cant share of the recent movements in the ex-
change value of the dollar against seven other
currencies. First, we present a summary of the
apparent monetary-policy considerations which
shaped monetary developments in the 1975-78
period. Then we show that the actual changes in
the excess money supply led to changes in prices
and. exchange rates in a way consistent with
economic theory. Finally, we present formal
statistical tests ofthe relationship between mon-
ey and exchange rates whichconfirmand quanti-
fy the empirical relations.
Monetary Policy 1975-78
In the summer of 1975, all eight countries in
this study faced a common set of economic
problems-two or more years of double-digit
inflation and the recent emergence ofa business
recession which, for most countries, was the
worst in the post-World War II period. Different
governments (and their monetary authorities)
responded to these twin problems in different
ways.
In the U.S., the primary goal apparently was
to deal with the historically high unemployment
rate by following a monetary policy which per-
mitted a substantial acceleration in aggregate
demand from 1975 through 1978. Other coun-
tries such as Germany, Japan and Switzerland,
responding to the historically high inflation rate,
apparently followed a monetary policy which
permitted only a moderate acceleration in aggre-
gate demand.
As a result of this divergence in monetary
policies, short-run rates of real growth also
diverged. The U.S. grew at a rate from 1975 to
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1978 which was above its historical average, but
the reverse was true for Germany, Japan and
Switzerland. Overthe longer run, thesedivergent
monetary policies led to divergent inflationrates.
From 1976 to 1978 the inflation rate in the U.S.
accelerated, while the inflation rates inGermany,
Japan and Switzerland decelerated. Finally, the
policy divergence between the U.S. and Ger-
many, Japan and Switzerland led to a decline in
the exchange value of the dollar with regard to
the Deutschemark, yen and Swiss franc.
Marshalling the Evidence
In broad outline, we assert that divergent
monetary policies have been the key factor
behind the divergent economic developments
and exchange-rate movements ofthe pastseveral
years. The evidence in support ofthis scenario is
provided in Charts I and 2.5 Chart I shows that
from 1975 to 1978, the money supply in the U.S.
grew at about the same rate as in Switzerland,
and more slowly than in Germany and Japan.
However, as discussed in the theoretical section,
the relevant measure is not the growth in the
nominal money supply, but rather the growth in
the excess money supply, which is nominal
money less real money demand, as is shown in
Chart 2.
In estimating real money demand, the means
of payment (i.e., transactions) motive was mea-
sured by the trend in industrial production, and
the store ofvalue motive for holding moneywas
measured by the trend in velocity. Sixty-month
trends ofthese factors were utilized,toreflectthe
assumption that reversible cyclical shifts in the
components of real money demand would have
no effect on thelong-termequilibriumprice level(P), and thus no effect on the exchange rate.6
Calculated on that basis, excess moneygrowthin
the U.S. was higher in the 1975-78 period thanin
Germany, Japan and Switzerland (Chart 2).
Domestic Results. The relationship between
excess money growth and real outputgrowth is a
short-run phenomenon. Thus, we would expect
that those countries with the highest excess
money growth would, in the short run, exhibit
the most rapid growth in real output. Theresults
in Table I and Chart 2 confirm that result. The
U.S., where growth in excess money has been
fastest among the four coul1tries since 1975, has
also had thefastest rateofreal growth. Germany,
withtheslowest growthofexcess money, has had
the slowest real growth, and Japan and Switzer-
land have fallen in between.7
The relationship between excess money
growth and prices is a long-run phenomenon.
Thus, excess money-growth patterns would not
necessarily be completely reflected in the ob-
served price patterns for consumer and whole-
sale prices to date. (Tables 2 and 3). Forall four
countries and for both price indexes, the
inflation rate has dropped substantially since
1974. The U.S. and Japan recorded almost the















the last four years (close to 7 percent)-
substantially higher than that observed in
Germany (4 percent) and Switzerland (2 per-
cent). In the period 1977.3-1978.3, however,
Japan's inflation rate had decelerated to 4
percent, and the German and Swiss rates have
also decelerated, while the U.S. rate has
accelerated to almost 8 percent. As a result, the
spread in the consumer inflation rates between
the U.S. and the other three countries has
widened recently in line with the differences in
their excess money growth.
Thesame basic patternemerges with respect to
wholesale prices, but with an even wider spread
since 1977.3. For one reason, there is a larger
weight of traded goods in the wholesale index
than in the consumer index. Thus, changes in the
exchange rate which directly affect inter-
nationally-traded goods prices will have a larger
and more immediate impact on the WPI than on
the CPI. This may be thegenesis ofthe vicious vs.
virtuous cycle argument. Countrieswhose mone-
tary policies tend to decelerate inflation experi-
ence an immediate favorable impact on the
exchange rate which reduces the inflation rate
promptly; while countries whose monetary poli-
cies tend to accelerate inflationsufferan immedi-
ate unfavorable effect on the exchange rate
which promptly adds to domestic inflation. This







100reflection of the timing ofthe monetary impact
on prices, rather than as a new destabilizing
phenomenon. This subject is discussed further in
Section IV.
Exchange Rate Results. These domestic re-
sults are broadlyconsistent with the assumptions
ofrelativelyeasymonetarypolicyin the U.S. and
relatively tight monetary policies in Germany,
Japan and Switzerland. To measure the impact
ofthese assumed divergent policies on exchange
rates, we have computed a "monetary index"-
the ratio of the excess money supply in the U.S.
to the excess supply in each of the other coun-
tries. Each monetary index is scaled to the
corresponding exchange rate by the coefficients
estimated in the equation in the appendix ofthis
article. As indicated in Chart 3, this monetary
index shows a high degree of correspondence
with the movement in the bilateralexchange rate
Table 1
Industrial Production
(Annual Rate ,of Change)
1963-73 1973-75 1975.1-1978.3
Germany 5.1 -4.3 2.1
Japan 12.3 -7.5 6.7
Switzerland 4.6 -6.7 3.0
United States 5.4 -4.7 7.8
Table 2
Consumer Price Index
(Annual Rate of Change)
1973.4- 1974.4- 1977.3-
1974.4 1978.3 1978.3
Germany 6.5 4.0 2.5
Japan 24.4 7.3 4.0
Switzerland 8.7 2.0 1.0
United States 12.1 6.8 7.9
Table 3
Wholesale Price Index
(Annual Rate of Change)
1973.4- 1974.4- 1977.3-
1974.4 1978.3 1978.3
Germany 13.4 2.5 1.2
Japan 23.5 0.9 -3.3
Switzerland 12.7 -2.4 -4.0
United States 22.2 5.6 8.3
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between the dollar and each of these three cur-
rencies. In each case, the monetary index de-
clined in 1974, rose slightly in 1975 and early
1976, and then declined substantially through
the end of 1978. This movement in the monetary
index is paralleled by a similar movement in the
exchange rate. Themajordecline in theexchange
value of the dollar was accompanied by a major
expansion in the excess money supplyin the U.S.
relative to the other three countries.
In general, adjustments of exchange rates to
changes in the monetary indexappeared to occur
quickly-within a quarter of a year or so. And
the magnitudes of these exchange-rate adjust-
ments were approximately the sameacross coun-
tries for any given change in the monetaryindex.
This observation is consistent with the hypothe-
sis developed in Section II, that the exchange
rate in the short run is dominated by the capital
account of the balance of payments, and that it
thus responds quickly-in a way analogous to
any domestic-asset market response to changes
in supply and demand.
The same broad relationship of monetary
indexes and bilateral exchange rates holds for
Canada, France, Italy and the U.K.. The results
for France and Italyare detailed in Chart4. With
these four countries, however, the lags between
changes in the monetary index and theexchange
rate seem to be longer and the degree ofrelation-
ship weaker, than in the case with Germany,
Japan and Switzerland for a number ofreasons.
First, Germany and Japan are leadingeconomic
powers in their own right, so thattheircurrencies
are potential replacements for the dollar as an
international currency. Also, the Swiss franchas
a unique role as an international store ofvalue,
and the Swiss monetary authorities have
followed a more restrictive monetary policythan
most of the countries studied.
Second, excess money-supply growth has been
even greater in Canada, Italy and the U.K. than
in the U.S. over the 1974-78 period. (French
growth has been slightly less expansionary). As a
consequence, the dollar generally strengthened
against these currencies before weakening in the
second half of 1977. The recent weakness ofthe
dollar may in part reflect a spill-over ofthe ap-
preciation of the Swiss franc and especially the
D.M. onto other European currencies. Thiswould occur among the European currencies ifa
common set of "real" exchange rate influences
operated. (The dollar's relative strength against
the Canadian dollar supports this conjecture.)
Third, in the case of the U.K., a special real
factor may explain the relative weakness ofthe
dollar. That factor is the recent favorable effect
of North Sea oil on the British balance of pay-
ments.
Theevidence presentedabovetends tosupport
a monetary interpretation of much ofthe recent
movements in the exchange value of the dollar,
especially against the D.M., the yen and the
Swiss franc-and substantially with respect to
the Canadian dollar, the Italian lira, the French
franc and the British pound. The next step is to
present evidence in a more formal econometric
setting. This will help show whetherthe relation-
ship between the monetary index and the ex-
change rate is significant and stable within a
rigorous statistical testing procedure. Those
readers who are not interested in this necessarily
technical discussion should proceed to the sec-
tion on forecasting exchange rates on page 30.
Chart 3
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26Formal Statistical Tests
The exchange rates to be testedarethe bilater"
al rates between the U.S. dollar and the seven
foreign currencies discussed above. The coun-
tries were selected on the basis ofdataavailabili-
tyand importance in international trade and
finance.· All regressions were estimated with
ordinary least~squares (OLS) using a third-
degree (or less) polynomial distributed lag
(PDL). The equations were estimated with two
alternative measures of money published in
International Financial Statistics-money, and
money plus quasi-money. The formeris the
narrow definition of money including currency
and demand deposits. This primarily statisfies
the means-of-payment motive for holdingmo-
ney. The latter is the broader definition which
includes currency, demand deposits and quasi-
monetary· deposits of commercial banks. This
measure includes a substantialstore-of-value
motive for holding money.
While statistically significant results were ob-
tained with both definitions of money, the
broader measure gave results which weregener-
Chart 4
















































'Monetary Index=Ratio of excess money supply in foreign
country to excess U.S. money supply.
27ally superior. Given the dollar's role as both an
international means of payment and store of
value, the superiority of the broader measureof
money is not surprising.
The equations for theseven bilateralexchange
rates were estimated monthlyfromJanuary 1974
(orJanuary1975) to December 1977 in bothlevel
and rate-of-change form, i.e., matching equa-
tions II and 12. The level resultsarepresentedin
the appendix, and the rate-of-change(difference)
results are presented in Table 4. The percent of
variation explained (R2) is much higher in the
level form than in the difference form, because
the unsystematic variance is necessarily greater
in the latter. However, a better measure of
goodness offit is provided by the standarderror,
which measures the percentage error in explain-
ing the exchange rate. The standard errors are
about the same for both forms of estimation.s
The major conceptual difference between the
level and difference form is the implicit treatment
of real factors which affect the exchange rate. In
both forms, the real factor is captured by the
constant term. In the level equation, we assume
that the realfactors are unchanged overtime, but
in the difference equation, we assume that they
change at a constant rate overtime. However, as
the constant term is both large and statistically
significant only for Italy in the difference form,
there is only weak general evidence for a strong
real factor affecting the exchange rate.9 This
suggests that either form of the equation would
represent the underlyingstructurewithout major
systematic bias. The remainder ofthe discussion
will be in terms of the rate-of-change equations
except where otherwise stated.
The monetary effect is measured by the sum
coefficient value(Ial')' It is a sum because it
measures the combined effect ofthe current and
lagged values of the monetary influence on the
exchange rate. The coefficient values arestatisti-
cally significant in all cases. Thelags between the
monetary influence and the exchange rate mea-
sure the total number of months needed for the
monetary effect to operate. The lag periods were
selected on the basis of the minimum standard
Table 4
Monetary Factors and Exchange Rates: Difference Form
n
Lllog EXt == a,,' + Ial'Lllog(MEr/ MEus)t-n
Estimation Degreesof Corrected
Country Period lags Freedom ao ~al' R' S.E. RHO D.W.
Canada* 1974.01-1977.12 6-18 44 -.003506 1.076 .096 .0097 1.83
(-1.21) (2.16)
France 1975.01-1977.12 12 32 -.000053 1.761 .168 .0168 1.70
(-.17) (1.95)
Germany 1975.01-1977.12 9 32 -.000023 2.565 .137 .0177 1.45
(.07) (2.69)
Italy 1974.01-1977.12 9 44 ".03392 5.487 .332 .0193 .42 1.85
(-1.80) (2.27) (3.17)
Japan 1975.01-1977.12 6 32 -.004021 2.887 .205 .0132 1.73
(-1.75) (3.17)
Switzer-
land 1974.01-1977.12 2 45 -.002440 2.649 .135 .0227 1.54
(-.62) (2.96)
U.K.** 1975.01-1977.12 15 32 -.015769 3.060 .352 .0170 .44 1.61
(-1.29) (2.01) (2.90)
t -statistics in parentheses
* Includes only lags t-6 to t-18




1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Estimation Period
In the theoretical discussion (Section II), we
hypothesized that the expected value of the
monetary influence on exchange rates would be
positive and equal in value to 1.0. This results
from the method of calculating the monetary
influence-the ratio ofexcess money in the U.S.
to excess money in each of the other countries.
Excess money is, in turn, defined as the differ-
ence between the change in nominal money
supply and the change in real money demand. If
money is homogeneous of the degree one in
prices, i.e., ifneutralityconditionshold, a perma-
nent I-percent increase in excess money willlead
to a I-percentincrease in the long-run equilibri-
um price level and, thus, to a I-percent decrease
in the exchange value ofthe dollar, assuming no
change in excess money in other countries.
The estimated coefficient values are positive
for all of the countries considered in this study.
However, only in the case ofCanadaand France
are the coefficient values close to one. In the case
of Germany, Japan, Switzerland and the U.K.,
the coefficient values fall within a narrow range
of 2.5 to 3.1. Italy, on the other hand, falls
significantly outside the range, with a coefficient
value of 5.5. 10
One factor which can explain the divergence
between the expected theoretical value and the



















error of estimate. In general, the lags varied
sUbstantially between countries. They were the
shortest for Switzerland (2 months), and Japan
(6 months)-the countries with the shortest lags
between the monetary index and the exchange
rate (Chart 3). The lags were longest for Canada
(18 months), the U.K. (15 months), France (12
months), and Italy (9 months). Germany
provided the only exception to the general
parallelism of the formal statistical results and
the informal results in Charts 3 and 4, with its
relatively long (9 months) lag compared to those
of Japan and Switzerland.
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Forecasts of Money Growth Rates for 1979
The forecasts ofthe DM/$ and ¥ /$ exchange
rates were quite close to the actual decline in
value through March 1979. In the case of the
Swiss franc (SF/$) rate, the forecast was rea-
sonably accurate through mid-1978 and picked
1) An estimation period (1974-1977 for
Switzerland, and 1975-77 for Germany and
Japan) where the fitted values of the exchange
rate (Chart 5) are compared with the actual
values of the exchange rate. For all three
countries, the equations accurately tracked the
monthly movement in the exchange rate. 12
2) A forecast period (January 1978 to Decem-
ber 1979), with actual money-supply growth
used through November orDecember 1978, and
with money assumed to grow thereafter at the
same rate as it had grown over the previous 12
months (Table 5).
To demonstrate the effects of U.S. monetary
policy on exchange rates, two different sets of
forecasts were performed. The first assumes U.S.
money growth over 1979 to be equalto theactual
rate of growth over 1978: 8.75 percent. The
second set offorecasts assumes a lower money-
growth rate of 6.5 percent. These two forecasts
are indicated by the two dotted lines in Chart
5. No adjustment is made for past forecast
errors (i.e., the simulations are dynamic), so that
the errors cumulate from the initial condition
month (December 1977) to the month being
forecast. As Chart 5 indicates, the forecast
money-based exchange rate tracks the actual
exchange rate with reasonable accuracy. The
following table shows the actual and forecast



















Forecasting the Exchange Rate
The results presented above, although tenta-
tive, provide a reasonable basis for makingshort
term forecasts ofexchange rates. Such forecasts
would be useful because our equations·Were
estimated with data only through December
1977 (Table 4), while some ofthe largest declines
in the dollar's value occurred in 1978 and were
only partially reversed by the dramatic dollar-
rescue operations announced on November I,
1978. We can estimate the degree of monetary
influence on the exchange rate in 1978 by con-
ducting dynamic simulations of our equations.
The results are presented for twotimeperiods:
is measurement error with respect to the public's
real demand for money. Errors ofthis type can
occur when there is a permanent shift in the
demand for money which is not captured bythe
60-month trend procedure. As discussed in Sec-
tion I, inflation can have an importanteffecton
real demand for money. In countries whichhave
been more successful than the U.S. inreducing
inflation (such as Germany, Japan and Switzer-
land) the real demand for money may be higher
than our measured demand for money.. Con-
versely, in countries which have been less suc-
cessful than the U.S. in reducing inflation (such
as Italyand the U.K.), the real demandfor money
may be less than measured demand. Assuming
that the real demand for money is accurately
measured in the U.S., the errors. in the other
countries could bias the monetary index. In all
cases the bias would tend to make the observed
index move in a narrower range than the true
monetary index, with a smallerdecline forthose
countries with a lower inflation rate than the
U.S., and a smaller increase for those countries
with a less successful recOfd than the U.S. in
controlling inflation. In each case, the measured
monetary index would have a greater coefficient
value than would the true monetary index. This
analysis is broadly consistent with the observed
coefficient values. Those countries with coeffi-
cient values close to one (Canada and France)
experienced roughly the same amount of infla-
tion as the U.S., while those countries with
coefficient values substantially greater than one
recorded inflation rates which were significantly




the turnaround in late 1978, but it erred in
forecasting the level of the exchange rate. The
reason behind this forecast error waS the sharp
acceleration in Swiss money growth in the sec-
ond half of 1978, which seems to have been
ignored by the market until now. The model



















grows at the rates indicated in Table 5, then
between March and December 1979 the dollar
will appreciate against the Swiss franc, be stable
against the Japanese yen, and decline slightly
against the German D.M.
Very good results were obtained when the
same forecast experiment was conducted with
respect to the dollar and the French franc. In
France's case, the errorwas only .6 percent over
the forecast period. However, the forecast errors
were in excess of 10 percent for Canada, Italy,
and the U.K. In two cases (Italy and the U.K.),
the actual dollar value was below the forecast
value, while in one case (Canada), it was above
the forecast value. In all three cases, significant
non-monetary factors apparently influenced
these exchange rates.
IV. Conclusion and Implications
Themajor conclusion ofthis article is that an
important share of the exchange-rate move-
ments ofthedollaragainst key foreign currencies
can be explained by monetary factors, rather
than by speculation or changes in such real
factors as the terms of trade. In addition, the
study suggests two major implications:
I) Foreign-exchange markets adjust much
more quickly than domesticcommodity markets
to changes in domestic monetary conditions.
2) The emergence of flexible exchange rates
can shorten the lag between money and prices.
One of the most generally accepted proposi-
tions in economics is that money affects goods
markets and, therefore, the inflation rate with a
relatively long lag. On the other hand, it affects
asset markets and, therefore, interest rates with
a relatively short lag. The reason for the differ-
ence in response is that costs ofadjustment are
much higher in goods markets than in asset
markets. It is difficult for a household to specu-
late on a rise in the priceofbread by buying more
bread than it cancurrentlyconsume. Thestorage
costs are high, and the depreciation onthe value
ofthe good is substantial. As a result, household
expectationsofhigherprices,even when strongly
held, will not necessarily be translated immedi-
ately into higher actual prices. Now consider the
case ofan asset market, such as thatforTreasury
bills. If the price of T-bills is expected to rise in
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the future, it will be instantaneously translated
into a higher price of Treasury bills today. For
one reason, the transactions cost involved in
shifting from one type of asset to another is
relatively low, and for another, the storage costs
for holding Treasury bills are virtually nil. Thus,
we can expect nearly instantaneous adjustment
in asset markets to shifts in underlying supply
and demand.
This article extends asset-market analysis to
the exchange rate. We assert that the exchange
rate is, in the short run, determined by the same
factors which determine the price of any asset.
Thus, a monetary disturbance can be translated
relatively quickly into a change in the exchange
rate, even though the change in the underlying
inflation rate may be delayed. This suggests that
the short-run deviation of the exchange rate
from purchasing power parity may be substan-
tial, even when the underlying cause of the
exchange-ratechange is a monetaryratherthana
real disturbance. Supporting evidence is pro-
vided by the relatively short lags observed in the
monetary index-the relation between U.S. and
foreign excess money-supply growthrates-,-and
in the resulting changes in the bilateralexchange
rates ofthedollaragainstforeign currencies. Full
lag adjustments for some countries were as short
as two to three months, and.were never longer
than eighteen months. The average lags wereshorter still. On the other hand, most empirical
evidence relating money to inflationsuggestsan
average lag of about two years, and full-effect
lags of three to four years.
A second implication of this study concerns
the shortened linkbetweenmoneyand pricesasa
result of the introduction of flexible exchange
rates. A rise in excess money supply in the U.S.
would, with a relatively short lag, lead to a
decline in the exchange value of the dollar
against its major trading partners. For reasons
discussed above, this would tend to raise the
price not only of imported goods, but of all
internationally-traded goods, in dollar terms.
American exporters would not sell in the U.S.
market for a lower price than theycould getfor
the same product in a foreign market, standard-
izing for transportation costs.· The rise in
tradeable-goods prices would increase the aver-
age inflation rate in the U.S. byanamountequal
to the weight oftradeable goods in overallprice
indexes. The weights would vary •between
indexes-high for the wholesale-price index
(which includes only goods), but lowerfor the
consumer-price index (which includes services)
and for the GNP price deflator (which incfudes
the cost of government).
Direct evidence of a shortening of the lag
between money and prices would have to come
from econometric tests ofthe lag structure. It is
difficult to acquire such evidence because ofthe
relativelyshortperiod in whichflexible exchange
rates have operated. However, a certain amount
ofindirectevidencesupportsthis proposition. To
the extent that inflation operates through the
exchange rate rather than through standard
domestic markets, the price of goods (which are
internationally traded) may rise relative to the
price of services (which are not generally traded
internationally) in the short run. This reverses
the traditional ordering of the effects of money
on prices. Generally, wholesale-price indexes
tend to exhibit a lower average inflation rate
than consumer-price indexes, as a reflection of
the higher productivity ofgoods industries than
services industries. However, since the March
1973 introduction offlexible exchange rates, the
rate ofinflation in the goods-dominated (whole-
sale) index has been higher than the rate of
inflation in the services-denominated (consum-
er) index. This is consistentwithaninternational
explanation of much of the recent inflation.
Appendix
Monetary Factors and Exchange Rates: level Form
n
log EXt = aa + kal log (MEr/MEus)t-n
Estimation Degrees of Corrected
Country Period lags Freedom ao la1 R2 S.E. RHO D.W.
Canada* 1974.01-1977.12 6-12 44 -.076 .826 .935 .0095 .93 1.82
(-1.67) (3.00) (17.59)
France 1975.01-1977.12 12 32 1.297 2.682 .962 .0132 .58 I.71
(49.40) (9.82) (4.28)
Germany 1975.01-1977.12 6 32 1.131 2.018 .892 .0168 .77 1.49
(22.73) (5.17) (7.22)
Italy 1974.01-1977.12 3 44 6.611 1.163 .976 .0223 .92 .95
(147.98) (3.81) (15.74)
Japan 1975.01-1977.12 2 33 6.450 2.138 .941 .0145 .95 1.48
(21.43) (3.04) (18.99)
Switzer-
land 1974.01-1977.12 1.097 2.701 .945 .0222 .90 1.56
(15.97) (3.33) (14.07)
U.K.** 1974.01-1977.12 12 44 -.687 1.148 .980 .0193 .92 1.04
(-17.30) (4.33) (15.78)
t-statistics in parentheses
* Includes only lags t-6 to t-12
** Uses log of deviation of MI UK from trend
MI US
32FOOTNOTES
1. The intellectual foundation behind this article is the
monetarytheory ofthebalanceofpayments. One Of the
original papers by Harry Johnson was published in
1972 intheJournalofFinancialand QuantitativeAnaly-
sis. A surveyor recent works is presented in J.A.
Frenkel and H.G. Johnson (EdsJ The Monetary Ap-
proach to the Balance ofPayments, 1976. Important
recent contributions havebeen made byR. Dornbusch,
forexample, "The Theory of Flexible Exchange .Rate
Regimes and Macroeconomic Policy," Scandinavian
Journal of Economics (1977>'
2. There may be short-runsituations when destabiliz-
ing speculation is also profitable. This occurswhen the
"greater.fool"theoryoperates. An intelligentspeculator
may believe that a currency is undervalued andstillsell
it because he perceives that otherspeculatorsbelieve it
is still overvalued. Onecan make moneyin the short run
by speculating about the actions of other speculators
rather than about the economic fundamentals which
determine acurrency's long-run value. Butthis "greater
fool" approach can be profitable only for a limited
period of time.
3. Other important factors which influencethe demand
for money as a means of payment are various institu-
tional arrangements, such as the frequency with which
wages and salaries are paid. However, these factors will
change only slowly over time, and are not usually an
importantsource ofa change in the demandformoney.
4. Government intervention can also affect the ex-
change rate, but we ignore these effects for several
reasons. Government intervention can fall under three
headings: 1) actions to counter disorderly markets; 2)
central-bank purchases and sales of foreign exchange
for own account; and 3) Treasury purchases orsales of
foreign exchange through sale or redemption of debt
denominated in foreign-currency values. The first type
of intervention (countering disorderly markets) is by
definition transitory and reversible. Thus it has no
permanent effect on the exchange rate, the balance
sheet of the central bank, or the position of the Treas-
ury. The second typeofintervention affectsthe balance
sheet of the central bank. Sustained intervention in the
foreign-exchange market will either increase or dec-
rease central-bank holdings of foreign assets, and thus
change the domestic money supply. This type of inter-
vention is considered directlybythe way the equation is
estimated-through the excess money supply. The
third type of intervention (sale of foreign-denominated
government securities) affects the composition but not
the level of Government debt. Its effect on exchange
rates is not captured byourempirical estimation proce-
dures. However, this typeofintervention is insignificant
because of the recency and small scale ofsuch opera-
tions. The U.S. Treasury issued its first OM security in
January 1979 and its first Swiss franc security in Febru-
ary 1979. The total amount authorized by the Treasury
is $10 billion, and the amount actually sold is $3 billion.
5. This broad definition of money includes currency,
transactions deposits and quasi-money deposits of
commercial banks. A fuller discussion ofthe monetary
measures is given in thefollowing section on statistical
tests.
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6. More explicitly, log ME=log (M/\'f/iiJ), wheref is the
trend level in industrial production, and ii is the trend
level in velocity. Velocity equals industrial production
divided by the real money stock. Real money is the
nominal money stock (money plus quasi-money) de-
flated by the wholesale-price index. The trend level
estimates are calculated recurSively by multiplying
last period's trend level estimatebythe rate ofgrowthof
the actual variable over the past 60 months. F6rexam-
pie:
Veo = Veo
Rt = ( Vt - Vt-eo ) /60
Vt-eo
Vi = Vi-1 x (1 + Rt) For all t >60
This procedure was followed for all countries with the
exception of the U.K., for which there was no monthly
data for quasi-money, and for which there was insuffi-
cient monthly money data tocalculate thetrends. In the
U.K. case, money alone was used, instead of money
plus quasi-money, and the trend in real moneydemand
was estimated by extrapolating the average 1963-1973
nominal money growth rates in the U.K. and the U.S.
7. Other factors which could have explained these
differential growth rates, such as the size of the previ-
ous business-cycle downturn or the trend growth in the
economy, do not appear to have been significant. The
U.S. growth rate in the last three and a half years-7.8
percent-was significantly above its 1963-73 trend
growth of 5.4 percent. On the other hand, Germany's,
Japan's and Switzerland's recent growth rates were
significantly below their trend growth rates in the
decade ending in 1973. The size of the previous
business-cycle downturn also does not explain the
recent strength in the U.S. growth rate. Both Switzer-
land and Japan had a more severe downturn in their
economy in the 1973-75 period than the U.S., while
Germany had a downturn equal tothatofthe U.S. Thus,
it appears thatdifferences in monetarystimulation have
been a key factor in differences of real growth rates of
these four countries in the most recent business-cycle
expansion. The movement in the unemployment rate
was consistent with the pattern of growth rates in
industrial production. In the U.S., unemployment de-
clined significantly by 1978 from its 1975 peak rate. In
Germany, Japan and Switzerland, however, unemploy-
ment rates were equal to or above 1975 rates. This
suggests that real growth in those three countries had
been insufficient to absorb the natural growth in their
labor force and productivity, and thus suggests that
their growth had been below potential.
8. All of the level equations were estimated with Coch-
rane/Orcutt adjustment for the first-order serial corre-
lation of the error term.
9. In the case ofJapan, the constantterm isstatistically
significant but quantitatively small. In the case of the
U.K., the constant term is quantitatively large, but not
significant statistically.
10. Italy is the only country in which the constant term
has a large and statistically significant value. This
suggests that there were important real factors opera-
ting on the Italian exchange rate as well as the money
factors modeled in the equation.11. A related source of measurementerror is associa~
ted with market expectations. Market participants may
view current nominal money growth as aprecursorof
future growth in the nominal money supply. These
expectations could affect the exchange rate. ForexaTTl-
pie, when market participantsobservethesteady decet.-
eration over the last fouryears in Switzerland's nominal
money growth, they might reasonably. expect.that
pattern to continue and, thus,. wouldforecast alower
long-run equilibrium priceand lowerexchangevalue of
the dollar relative to the Swiss franc thanis implicitin
the actual trend of nominal money growth. These
expectational influences could bias the coefficient
values either above or below one~above one if the
market extrapolated current monetary developments,
and below one if the market expected the monetary
authorities to revert tosometrend value in theface ofan
observed deviation in money.
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To the extent that expectations have been important
in affecting coefficient values, these values may remain
unstable over long periods of time. Indeed, if all mone-
tary authorities followed constant money-growth rules,
this expectation factor would no longer influence mar-
ket participants and the coefficient values would move
toward unity.
12. The equations in Table 1 were estimated in differ-
ence form, while the charts were displayed in level form
for convenience in interpretation. This transformation
was achieved by conducting a static simulation of the
equations over the estimation period.
13. See footnote 6foran explanation ofwhythe narrow-
er aggregate (money) is used for the UK, as opposed to
the broader aggregate (money plus quasi-money)
which is used for the othercountries. The correspond-
ing growth rate for US money is 6 percent.